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I.    THE DEATH PENALTY IN TEXAS 
It feels as though local Texas news is constantly reporting on a new death 
sentence being handed down, an execution that has taken place, or a death 
row inmate fighting for his life.  Over the course of a month in the fall of 
2017, six death row inmates were the focus of reporting by major Texas 
media outlets.1  Why does Texas embrace capital punishment so strongly?   
In 1972, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that effectively put a halt 
 
 
1. See generally Keri Blakinger, Judge Sets Execution Date for Sugar Land Man Who Had Family  
Killed for $1 Million Inheritance, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 7, 2017, 11:20 AM), http://www.chron.com/ 
news/houston-texas/article/Judge-sets-execution-date-for-Sugar-Land-man-12336728.php [perma. 
cc/JV6H-99WU] (covering the setting of an execution date for a Fort Bend County murder); Jolie 
McCullough, Houston Serial Killer Faces Execution This Week, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2017, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/17/houston-serial-killer-faces-execution-week/ [perma.cc/ 
NCL5-E3X8] (describing a Texas serial killer’s crimes and announcing his date of execution); Jolie 
McCullough, Texas Executes Mexican National Despite International Ire, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 8, 2017, 
11:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/08/planned-execution-mexican-national-draws-
international-ire/ [perma.cc/E6VX-9AAM] (reporting on the execution of a Mexican national in 
Huntsville on November 8, 2017); Jolie McCullough, Texas Executes Robert Pruett, Who Insisted on 
Innocence in Prison Guard’s Murder, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2017/10/12/texas-executes-robert-pruett-who-insisted-innocence-prison-guards-murd/ [perma.cc/ 
3XVB-F25G] (providing an account of an execution that took place on October 12, 2017);  
San Antonio Man Set for March Execution for Lubbock Slaying, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/ba017961e9644857a5c9b16037d6e50a [https://perma.cc/YP3C-5T53] 
(announcing an execution date for a Texas inmate); Stephen Young, Dallas Child Killer  
John Battaglia’s Execution Set—For the Third Time, DALL. OBSERVER (Nov. 2, 2017, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-killer-john-battaglia-set-to-die-feb-1-10029868 [perma. 
cc/L93B-H3HS] (noting the execution date of a Texas inmate for February of 2018). 
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on all executions nationwide.2  This moratorium lasted until 1976 when the 
Court ruled a death sentence can be constitutional if the procedure with 
which it was obtained was within the guidelines of the Court.3  Since then, 
Texas has repeatedly led the nation in the number of executions carried out 
each year.4  Of the 1,465 executions in the United States since 1976, Texas 
is responsible for 545, nearly five times as many as the next leading state.5 
II.    FRAMING THE ISSUE: THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE 
GUIDANCE TO THE STATES TO DETERMINE INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY  
In recent years, the nation’s growing disapproval of the death penalty can 
be seen through Supreme Court opinions narrowing the scope of capital 
punishment,6 a number of states abolishing the practice,7 decreased number 
 
2. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (determining 
the way in which the presented death sentences were arbitrarily obtained constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment, essentially creating a moratorium on the death penalty in the United States). 
3. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191–92 (1976) (ruling not all death sentences are 
unconstitutional as long as they follow the guidelines set out by the court, including a bifurcated trial 
and sufficient jury instructions). 
4. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2016: YEAR END REPORT 2 
(2016), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2016YrEnd.pdf [http://perma.cc/VY3H-WUBU] 
(providing basic facts about the death penalty in the United States, including number of executions, 
races of executed offenders, and number of exonerations by state); David Von Drehle, Bungled 
Executions. Backlogged Courts. And Three More Reasons the Modern Death Penalty is a Failed Experiment, TIME, 
June 8, 2015, at 26, 28 (“Even in Texas, which leads the nation in executions since 1976[,] . . . the 
wheels are coming off the bandwagon.”).  But see Jolie McCullough, In an Unusual Year, Texas Didn’t 
Lead the Nation in Executions, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2016/12/15/unusual-year-death-penalty-texas-didnt-have-most-e/ [perma.cc/HZC5-GCP5] 
(“Texas—the state that has executed the most people by far since the death penalty was reinstated in 
the United States [forty] years ago—had the nation’s second-busiest death chamber this year for the 
first time since 2001.  Georgia’s nine executions in 2016 surpassed the Lone Star State’s record-low 
number of seven.”). 
5. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [perma.cc/XDR6-XLXN] (showing the 
number of executions in Texas since 1976 was 545, with the next leading state, Virginia, at 113 total 
executions). 
6. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315–16 (2002) (detailing the change in the country’s 
attitude since the Court’s Penry decision, which upheld the death penalty for intellectually disabled, 
apparent through a number of states enacting statutes explicitly prohibiting execution of intellectually 
disabled in response to the Penry opinion).  See generally Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) 
(declaring the death penalty an unconstitutional punishment for the rape of a child where the child did 
not die and the offender did not intend to cause death to the child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
578–79 (2005) (abrogating the death penalty for defendants under the age of eighteen at the time the 
offense was committed). 
7. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, since 2007, seven states— 
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York—have abolished 
3
Green: Texas, the Death Penalty, and Intellectual Disability
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
1032 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1029 
of executions,8 and the number of death sentences imposed.9  In 2002, the 
Supreme Court opined Atkins v. Virginia,10 their first opinion categorically 
prohibiting the death penalty in relation to intellectually disabled 
offenders.11  Atkins and co-defendant, Jones, kidnapped Eric Nesbitt, 
robbed him, drove him to an ATM to withdraw more money, then drove 
him to a final location where they proceeded to shoot Mr. Nesbitt eight 
times, killing him.12  Ultimately, the Virginia state court sentenced Atkins 
to death despite testimony by a forensic psychologist that Atkins was 
“mildly mentally retarded.”13  Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court 
analyzed Atkins’ claim under the Eighth Amendment.14  Justice Stevens’ 
 
the death penalty.  States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 9, 
2016), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [perma.cc/5DCP-WDXX].  
Three additional states—Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Washington—have gubernatorial moratoria in 
place.  Id. 
8. “Executions continued their historic decline in 2016, with [twenty] executions carried out by 
just five states.  It was the fewest number of executions in the [United States] since 1991 and the fewest 
number of states carrying them out since 1983.”  DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 4, at 5.  
9. According to the Death Penalty Information Center,  
Fewer death sentences will be imposed in 2016 than in any other year since the Supreme Court 
declared [United States] death penalty statutes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia in 1972. . . .  
The [thirty] death sentences expected to be imposed in 2016 represent a [thirty-nine percent] 
decline from last year’s [forty-two]-year low, and are down more than [ninety percent] from the 
315 death sentences imposed during the peak death-sentencing year of 1996. 
See id. at 3 (highlighting the changes in the death penalty in the year 2016); see also Drehle, supra note 4, 
at 27 (explaining several reasons why the United States has seen a decline in the death penalty); Jeffrey 
M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972, GALLUP NEWS (Oct. 26, 2017), 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/221030/death-penalty-support-lowest-1972.aspx [perma.cc/8KBR-
3W6M] (“Americans’ support for the death penalty has dipped to a level not seen in [forty-five] years.  
Currently, [fifty-five percent] of [United States] adults say they favor the death penalty for convicted 
murderers.”). 
10. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
11. See id. at 320–21 (holding a death penalty sentence would violate the Eighth Amendment as 
applied to intellectually disabled criminals). 
12. Id. at 307. 
13. Id. at 308–09.  The term “mentally retarded” is quoted in some materials included in this 
comment because that was the medically acceptable term at the time it was used.  Now, however, the 
accepted term is “intellectually disabled.”  See Use of Mental Retardation on this Website, AM. ASS’N ON 
INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/historical-context [perma.cc/ 
938U-CDW6] (explaining that while the term used to define intellectual disability has changed, the 
essential elements in a diagnosis have not); see also Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 
(2010) (changing the term “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability” in all federal laws). 
14. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII)); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment). 
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majority opinion makes clear that execution of the intellectually disabled 
does not further any policy purposes for which capital punishment was 
intended.15  As the Court states, the difficulty lies in determining whether 
an individual qualifies as intellectually disabled for purposes of removing the 
death penalty as a possible punishment.16  However, instead of providing 
guidance on how to answer the more difficult question, the Court side-steps 
the issue and simply states: “[W]ith regard to insanity, ‘we leave to the 
State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional 
restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’”17  The only direction 
provided by the Court was that intellectual disability had to be a clinically 
defined disorder “requir[ing] not only subaverage intellectual functioning, 
but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-
care, and self-direction that became manifest before age [eighteen].”18  The 
states were then entrusted with the task of determining the appropriate 
methods in order to arrive at the clinical definition.19  While, theoretically, 
the Atkins ruling was a step in the right direction for opponents of capital 
punishment, the Court’s declination to establish guidelines and allowing the 
states to enact their own procedures on how to determine intellectual 
disability for purposes of removing the death penalty led to difficulty in the 
implementation of the ruling.20  As a result, states have adopted varying 
 
15. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (“We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded 
criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty.”). 
16. Id. at 317. 
17. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416–17 (1986)). 
18. Id. at 318.  See generally Timothy R. Saviello, The Appropriate Standard of Proof for Determining 
Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases: How High Is Too High, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 163, 174–78 (2015) 
(expounding on the Atkins Court’s failure to provide any guidance on how to comply with its ruling). 
19. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (leaving the task of developing appropriate procedure to deal 
with this issue to the states). 
20. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Christopher Seeds, Of Atkins and Men: Deviations 
from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 689, 
689 (2009) (addressing the shortfalls of the Atkins ruling, including the effects stereotypes have had on 
improperly excluding some individuals from the Atkins exemption); Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge 
of Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and 
Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 811-18 (2007) 
(recognizing the difficulties states have in implementing the ruling of Atkins and proposing methods 
states could use to cohesively define intellectual disability); Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A 
Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255, 256 (2003) (“In contrast to the overarching aim of the 
majority’s opinion in Atkins—making the administration of capital punishment more equitable—the 
Supreme Court’s latest prescription of psychiatric help may only add a new layer of complexity and 
confusion to the already capricious process through which the [United States] criminal justice system 
imposes death sentences.”); Natalie A. Pifer, The Scientific and the Social in Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 
41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1036, 1037–38 (2016) (exploring the difficulty the Atkins ruling presents to 
5
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methods of determining intellectual disability resulting in “state capital 
systems that are worlds apart.”21  In the years following the Atkins ruling, 
trial-and-error was obvious: states would enact a statute22 and construe the 
statute through case law,23 which would subsequently be overruled by the 
Supreme Court.24 
 
courts in navigating the social and scientific aspects of intellectual disability); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, 
Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders And Excluding Them From Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 
77, 77–78 (2003) (expounding on the different ways in which states define mental retardation and the 
way in which it effects the procedures they impose for determining which offenders to exclude from 
capital punishment). 
21. Deborah W. Denno, Courting Abolition, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1836 (2017) (reviewing 
CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT); see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A (West 2017) (defining intellectual disability as 
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is accompanied by significant limitations 
in adaptive functioning in at least two . . . of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home 
living, social or interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic 
skills, work, leisure, health and safety.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1 (2017) (outlining 
Louisiana’s procedure for determining intellectual disability and characterizing the disability as a 
combination of intellectual and adaptive deficits which manifested during the individual’s 
developmental period); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-101 (West 2017) (outlawing imposition of a death 
sentence on an individual with “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that exists 
concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning” and the limited functioning has 
presented itself prior to age twenty-two); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (West 2017) (characterizing 
intellectual disability as a combination of limited intellectual functioning as determined by current 
psychological exams and deficits in adaptive behavior presented before the age of eighteen), declared 
unconstitutional by Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); see also States That Have Changed Their Statutes to 
Comply With the Supreme Court’s Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-have-changed-their-statutes-comply-supreme-courts-decision-
atkins-v-virginia [perma.cc/3P5H-DTKW] (detailing the differing methods some states have 
formulated to evaluate claims of intellectual disability in response to the Atkins ruling). 
22. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2013) (codifying Florida’s method to determine 
intellectual disability for purposes of abrogating the death penalty), declared unconstitutional by Hall v. 
Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). 
23. See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712 (Fla. 2007) (construing FLA. STAT. § 921.137 as 
establishing a bright-line cut off for intellectual disability at an intelligence quotient of seventy), abrogated 
by Hall, 572 U.S. 701; Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 708–10 (Fla. 2012) (affirming the statutory 
construction from Cherry), rev’d, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2004) (creating seven common law factors to determine intellectual disability for purpose of 
abrogating the death penalty because Texas lawmakers had failed to enact a statutory method), abrogated 
by Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). 
24. See generally Moore, 137 S. Ct at 1052–53 (rejecting Texas’ attempt to comply with Atkins and 
the Briseno factors as unconstitutional because of the high risk they create of executing an offender with 
an intellectual disability); Hall, 572 U.S. at 723–24 (striking down Florida’s statute defining intellectual 
disability enacted for the purposes of complying with Atkins v. Virginia). 
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A. Hall v. Florida: Florida’s Attempt at Atkins Compliance 
The state most notably attempting to comply with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Atkins was Florida.25  Florida enacted a pre-Atkins statute 
prohibiting a penalty of death on an intellectually disabled defendant.26  In 
Cherry v. State,27 the Florida Supreme Court construed the three prong 
statute to establish a bright-line cut off for establishing an intellectual 
disability at an intelligence quotient (IQ) of seventy.28  If the defendant 
failed to satisfy the first prong by proving an IQ of seventy, they were barred 
from presenting evidence of the second and third prong.29  Florida believed 
the imposition of a strict cutoff satisfied the statutory definition of 
“significant subaverage general intellectual functioning.”30  The seemingly 
arbitrary score of seventy was arrived at by interpreting “subaverage general 
intellectual functioning” as two standard deviations below the average IQ 
score of 100.31  The Supreme Court admits that Florida is not precluded 
from including standard deviations in their calculations.32  However, a 
serious problem arises when a strict cutoff is construed—the defendant is 
precluded from presenting any other mitigating evidence of his disability.33  
As a result, in Cherry, a death sentence was upheld for a defendant because 
 
25. See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 714 (construing section § 921.137 of the Florida Statute as 
establishing a bright-line cut off for intellectual disability at an IQ of seventy).  Two other states also 
enacted a post-Atkins statute with a strict IQ cutoff at seventy: Delaware and Virginia.  Hall, 572 U.S. 
at 717. 
26. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (defining intellectual disability as: “significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested 
during the period from conception to age [eighteen].  The term ‘significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning,’ for the purpose of this section, means performance that is two or more 
standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of 
the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.  The term ‘adaptive behavior,’ for the purpose of this 
definition, means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal 
independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.  The 
Agency for Persons with Disabilities shall adopt rules to specify the standardized intelligence tests as 
provided in this subsection”). 
27. Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007). 
28. Id. at 712–13. 
29. See id. at 714 (“Because we find that Cherry does not meet the first prong of the 
section 921.137(1) criteria, we do not consider the two other prongs of the mental retardation 
determination.”). 
30. See id. at 712–13 (explaining the plain language of the statute supported the court’s finding 
of a strict IQ cutoff). 
31. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 711–12 (2014) (citing FLA STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1)). 
32. Id. 
33. Id.; see also Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 714 (ruling an offender with an IQ of seventy-two failed to 
meet the state’s definition of intellectually disabled and thus was eligible for the death penalty). 
7
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he had an IQ of seventy-two and was consequently barred from presenting 
other evidence of disability.34 
A similar result was reached in Hall v. State,35 where the death sentence 
of an offender was upheld based on his IQ scores ranging between 
sixty-seven and seventy-five,36 and the court’s subsequent refusal to admit 
other evidence of his intellectual disability, including a doctor’s report 
determining his IQ score to be sixty-nine.37  Because the Supreme Court 
considered this to be unacceptable, it granted certiorari to review Hall’s 
sentence and Florida’s method.38  Ultimately the Court ruled the Florida 
method failed to meet current medical standards because it viewed an IQ 
score as conclusive evidence of intellectual disability, or lack thereof, and 
refused to take into consideration the factors experts would consider when 
making a diagnosis.39  For example, medical professionals decline to 
consider the IQ score as conclusive evidence because many factors 
contribute to fluctuating scores.40  In essence, the Supreme Court took the 
opportunity in Hall v. Florida,41 to narrow the broad ruling of Atkins.42  The 
Court highlights the importance in relying on medical professionals and 
experts when seeking a diagnosis of intellectual disability.43  The Supreme 
Court is explicit in Hall that current medical standards should be relied on 
and a myriad of factors should be considered when determining whether an 
 
34. See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 712–14 (refusing to consider evidence introduced by offender to 
satisfy the second and third prongs of section 921.137 of the Florida Statute because he failed to satisfy 
the first prong by proving his IQ is seventy or below). 
35. See Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012) (affirming the statutory construction from 
Cherry), rev’d, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014). 
36. See id. at 706 (“While there is no doubt that [Hall] has serious mental difficulties, is probably 
somewhat retarded, and certainly has learning difficulties and a speech impediment, the Court finds 
that [Hall] was competent at the resentencing hearings.” (quoting Hall v. State, 742 So. 2d 255, 229 
(Fla. 1999))). 
37. Id. at 710. 
38. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 704 (“This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an unacceptable risk 
that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.”). 
39. Id. at 712–16. 
40. See id. (describing how medical professionals use many factors to determine intellectual 
disability). 
41. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). 
42. See James W. Ellis, Hall v. Florida: The Supreme Court’s Guidance in Implementing Atkins, 23 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 383, 390 (2014) (“One clear message is that the states are not free to define 
intellectual disability in any way they choose but must act consistently with the consensus of 
professionals in the field.”). 
43. See, e.g., Hall, 572 U.S. at 710 (“In determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is 
proper to consult the medical community’s opinions.”). 
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offender has an intellectual disability.44  This focus “calls into question the 
approach by a few courts that rest heavily on stereotypes about people with 
intellectual disability rather than on the scientific knowledge and experience 
accumulated by professionals in the field[,]”45 including the post-Atkins 
approach developed by Texas: the Briseno Factors.46 
B. Ex Parte Briseno: Texas Responds to Atkins 
As Atkins ascended to the Supreme Court, Jose Garcia Briseno awaited 
execution on Texas’s death row after being convicted and sentenced to 
death for the robbing and murdering of a Texas sheriff in his home in 
1991.47  Briseno filed multiple state and federal appeals, all of which were 
denied, and he was scheduled to be executed.48  The Supreme Court issued 
their Atkins opinion on June 20, 2002 and Briseno filed a writ of habeas 
corpus with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) on July 10, 2002—
the same day he was scheduled to be executed.49  Briseno argued he was 
“mentally retarded” and thus, ineligible for execution under Atkins.50  The 
CCA stayed his execution and ordered the original trial court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Briseno was in fact intellectually 
disabled under the Atkins standard.51  The habeas court ultimately found 
he did not qualify as intellectually disabled under Atkins and upheld his 
death sentence.52 
In their opinion affirming the trial court’s death sentence, the CCA 
acknowledged that it is the job of the Texas Legislature, not theirs, to create 
 
44. Id.; see also Ellis, supra note 42, at 390–91 (“[T]he Court’s emphasis on scientific and clinical 
understanding of intellectual disability calls into question the approach by a few courts that rest heavily 
on stereotypes about people with intellectual disability rather than on the scientific knowledge and 
experience accumulated by professionals in the field.”). 
45. Ellis, supra note 42, at 390–91. 
46. See Blume, Johnson & Seeds, supra note 20, at 702–03 (criticizing the methods utilized by 
some states, including Texas, for including stereotypical factors in their definition of intellectual 
disability); Mia-Carré B. Long, Of Mice and Men, Fairy Tales, and Legends: A Reactionary Ethical Proposal to 
Storytelling and the Briseño Factors, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 859, 865 (2013) (connecting the Briseno 
factors based on stereotypical attributes of an intellectually disabled individual, such as the character 
Lennie from the popular novel Of Mice and Men). 
47. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by Moore v. Texas, 
137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). 
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laws.53  However, since the legislature failed to enact any post-Atkins54 
statutes to comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling, and the CCA had been 
inundated with habeas corpus applications in the two years following Atkins, 
they created the law governing when an individual qualifies as intellectually 
disabled for purposes of abrogating a death sentence: the Briseno factors.55  
In developing these factors, the court states that medical professionals are 
more likely to broadly define and diagnose intellectual disability, but they 
must narrow that definition to only include individuals that the majority of 
Texas residents would agree should be exempt from the death penalty, 
individuals such as the character Lennie from Of Mice and Men.56  The CCA 
applied the definition of “mental retardation” created by the American 
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR)57 and stated: “(1) ‘significantly 
subaverage’ general intellectual functioning; (2) accompanied by ‘related’ 
limitations in adaptive functioning; (3) the onset of which occurs prior to 
the age of [eighteen].”58  Because the court found the “adaptive behavior 
criteria [to be] exceedingly subjective” they established seven nonclinical 
factors they believe demonstrate intellectual disability:  
• Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—
his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was 
mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that 
determination? 
 
53. Id. at 5. 
54. The Texas Legislature had attempted to pass a pre-Atkins statute in 2001, house bill 236, 
prohibiting the execution of the intellectually disabled defined as “significant subaverage general 
intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the 
developmental period.”  Id. at 6. (quoting Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001)).  The bill was vetoed 
by then-Governor Rick Perry.  See Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (proposing to prohibit 
imposition of a death sentence on the intellectually disabled; vetoed by Governor); see also Persons with 
Mental Retardation Act of Sept. 1, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 76, § 1, sec. 591.003(13), 1991 Tex. Sess. 
Law Serv. (amended 1993) (codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 591.003(13)) (providing the 
definition of “mental retardation” that was current at the time of the Briseno opinion).  
55. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5. 
56. Id. at 6.  See generally JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN (1937) (chronicling the story 
of a stereotypically intellectually disabled man, Lennie). 
57. In 2007, the AAMR formally changed its name to American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD).  Press Release, Am. Ass’n on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities, Mental Retardation is No More—New Name is Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (Mar. 2, 2007) (on file with author). 
58. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 (footnotes omitted) (citing AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION: 
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEM OF SUPPORT 5 (9th ed. 1992)). 
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• Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his 
conduct impulsive? 
• Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around 
by others? 
• Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, 
regardless of whether it is socially acceptable? 
• Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written 
questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject? 
• Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests? 
• Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital 
offense did the commission of that offense require forethought, 
planning, and complex execution of purpose?59 
After considering facts such as Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
officers’ testimony that Briseno seemed “normal” while in custody, none of 
his juvenile records indicated any sign of intellectual disability, and that 
Briseno’s testimony was coherent, the CCA upheld Briseno’s death 
sentence.60  
The Briseno factors were the law in Texas for thirteen years, though many 
in the medical and legal communities questioned their grounds and 
substance.61  However, consistent with the trial-and-error approach 
 
59. Id. at 8–9. 
60. Id. at 16–18.  Following this opinion, Briseno filed another habeas corpus petition and the 
CCA ordered a new punishment hearing based on an improper jury charge.  See Ex parte Briseno, No. 
AP-76132, 2010 WL 2332150, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 9, 2010) (not designated for publication) 
(remanding for a new punishment hearing because the instruction given to the jury violated the Eighth 
Amendment for failing to sufficiently apprise the jury of the lesser available punishments).  After 
negotiating a plea deal, Briseno’s death sentence was commuted to a life sentence.  Diane Jennings, 
Death Sentence of a Man Who Killed Sheriff Changed to Life, DALL. NEWS (May 2013), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2013/05/03/death-sentence-of-man-who-killed-sheriff-
changed-to-life [perma.cc/2EX2-KLJT]; see also Offenders No Longer on Death Row, TEX. DEP’T. CRIM. 
JUST. (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_offenders_no_longer_on_dr.html 
[perma.cc/V7GH-SEAY] (listing “Jose Briseno” as “Sentence commuted to life, #1853416”). 
61. See generally Blume, Johnson & Seeds, supra note 20, at 712 (criticizing the multiple ways in 
which the Briseno factors deviate from the clinically accepted methods of diagnosing intellectual 
disability); Hannah Brewer,  Note, The Briseno Factors: How Literary Guidance Outsteps the Bounds of Atkins 
in the Post-Hall Landscape, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 240, 241 (2017) (predicting the Briseno factors will be 
ruled unconstitutional after Hall v. Florida because they “differ from the clinical definitions of adaptive 
behavior deficits created by the same professional organizations whose opinions were relied on in 
Hall”); Hensleigh Crowell, Note, The Writing Is on the Wall: How the Briseno Factors Create an Unacceptable 
Risk of Executing Persons with Intellectual Disability, 94 TEX. L. REV. 743, 744 (2016) (analyzing the 
11
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observed in the Florida courts, Texas’s attempt to comply with Atkins was 
also held to “create an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual 
disability will be executed.”62  Bobby Moore was convicted and sentenced 
to death for the capital murder of a Houston store clerk during an attempted 
robbery and, on appeal, sought to abrogate his sentence by arguing 
intellectual disability.63  After multiple state and federal appeals, including a 
grant of federal relief which only led to another affirmation of his sentence 
by a state trial court, Moore was granted a hearing to present evidence of his 
intellectual disability.64  The habeas court, choosing to adopt the current, 
clinical definition of “intellectual disability,”65 as defined by the AAIDD, 
instead of the Briseno factors, found Moore to qualify for an Atkins 
exemption.66  However, the CCA disregarded the recommendation of the 
habeas court, applied the Briseno factors, and denied relief.67  At the habeas 
hearing, Moore presented strong evidence which the court relied on in 
determining his intellectual disability including: testimony of friends, family 
 
problems resulting from implementation of the Briseno factors); Long, supra note 46, at 859 (addressing 
the fact that the Briseno factors were derived from stereotypical attributes of an intellectually disabled 
individual, such as the character Lennie from the popular novel Of Mice and Men). 
62. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044, 1053 (2017) (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 
701, 704 (2014)) (rejecting Texas’s application of the Briseno factors because of their reliance on 
outdated medical guidelines, deviation from clinically accepted standards, and consideration of 
stereotypical characteristics ). 
63. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). 
64. Id. 
65. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS: DSM-5 31 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] (detailing current medical standards on 
diagnosing intellectual disability); Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEV. 
DISABILITIES, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.WeuF-hNSxE4 [perma.cc/24HM-
MYYP] (providing the currently accepted definition of intellectual disability as “characterized by 
significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, which covers many 
everyday social and practical skills.  This disability originates before the age of eighteen”).  The Briseno 
factors were based on the outdated “1992 (ninth) edition of the American Association on Mental 
Retardation (AAMR) manual, predecessor to the current AAIDD-11 manual.”  Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 
1046 (citing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).  The habeas court adopted the 
definition employed by the AAIDD, not the American Psychiatric Association (APA), which “omits 
the requirement that an individual’s adaptive behavior deficits must be ‘related to’ significantly sub-
average general intellectual functioning.”  GEORGE E. DIX & JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY, TEXAS 
PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 49:35 (3d ed. Supp. 2017). 
66. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 485. 
67. See id. at 486–87 (“[T]he habeas court concluded that it should use the most current position, 
as espoused by AAIDD, regarding the diagnosis of intellectual disability rather than the test we 
established in Briseno. . . .  The decision to modify the legal standard for intellectual disability in the 
capital-sentencing context rests with this Court unless and until the Legislature acts . . . .” (citing  
Ex parte Hearn, 310 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010))). 
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and medical professionals, that Moore was unable to comprehend concepts 
of days of the week or months of the year until after the age of thirteen, and 
Moore’s inability to read and write which led to his dropping out of school 
in the ninth grade and being forced to live on the street.68  Despite these 
indications of an intellectual disability, the CCA, in their “glass half-full 
perspective”69 was able to support a death sentence by shifting their focus 
from Moore’s adaptive deficits to his adaptive strengths.70  For instance, 
the court viewed Moore becoming homeless in order to avoid abuse at 
home as a strength because it indicated “good survival skills.”71  
Upon Moore’s petition and a plea by the medical, scientific, and legal 
communities,72 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to evaluate whether 
the Briseno framework is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment and 
Atkins v. Virginia.73  For multiple reasons, the Court ultimately held the 
Briseno factors unconstitutional for “creat[ing] an unacceptable risk that 
persons with intellectual disabilit[ies] will be executed.”74  First, the Court 
 
68. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045. 
69. See Blume, Johnson & Seeds, supra note 20, at 710 (describing the perspective adopted by 
the CCA in Ex parte Briseno as shifting the focus from limitations in adaptive behavior, as instructed by 
the clinical standard, to strengths in adaptive behavior which can invalidate claims of intellectual 
disability and increase the difficulty of establishing unvarying clinical definitions). 
70. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047 (“The habeas court, the CCA concluded, had erred by 
concentrating on Moore’s adaptive weaknesses.” (citing Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 489)). 
71. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by Moore, 137 S. Ct. 
1039. 
72. See Brief for The American Ass’n on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) & 
The Arc of the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29–30, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 
(No. 15-797), 2016 WL 4151447 [hereinafter AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner] 
(arguing the Supreme Court should reverse the CCA sentence because the Briseno framework deviates 
from the current, clinically accepted definition of intellectual disability); Brief for The American Bar 
Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797), 2016 WL 
4151449 (urging the Supreme Court to reverse the CCA judgment because the Briseno factors lack any 
scientific or clinical basis); Brief for The American Civil Liberties Union & The ACLU of Texas as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797), 2016 WL 4151448 
(advocating for the reversal of Moore’s sentence because the Briseno factors are under-inclusive and 
based on stereotypes of intellectual disability); Brief for American Psychological Ass’n (APA) et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16–17, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797), 2016 WL 4151451 
[hereinafter APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner] (requesting the Court hold the Texas 
method unconstitutional based on several ways in which it deviates from the methods accepted by 
mental health professionals). 
73. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048. 
74. Id. at 1051 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014)); see Adam Liptak,  
Texas Used Wrong Standard in Death Penalty Cases, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/us/politics/texas-death-penalty-supreme-court-ruling.html 
[https://perma.cc/WS4C-ZF8M] (reporting Texas’s failure to stay current on medical standards).  But 
13
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reiterated their reasoning from Hall v. Florida that, although Atkins gave the 
power to the states to develop an appropriate method for determining 
intellectual disability, that power does not extend to a total disregard of the 
current medical standards.75  As with any area of medical or scientific study, 
greater knowledge and understanding is gained over time through research 
and study by experts in the area.76 Texas’s use of the Briseno factors, based 
on a 1992 definition of intellectual disability, disregards current medical 
standards by failing to include the mental health advancements made in the 
preceding fifteen years.77  The CCA’s refusal to comply is further evidenced 
by their criticism of the habeas court for applying the current medical 
standard instead of the Briseno factors.78  The most critical deviation was the 
court’s shift in focus from Moore’s adaptive deficits to his adaptive 
strengths, contrary to the focus utilized by medical professionals, which 
allowed those strengths to counteract the weight of his deficits.79  The 
AAIDD stresses the purpose of focusing solely on an individual’s deficits 
and excluding any consideration of any strengths is to aid a professional in 
 
see Emily Taft, Moore v. Texas: Balancing Medical Advancements with Judicial Stability, 12 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 115, 126 (2017) (presenting support for Texas and the Briseno factors and 
explaining why the Supreme Court should have ruled them constitutional). 
75. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048–49. 
76. AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 27 (“As is the case in 
other fields, clinical science advances with new discoveries and, more frequently, with refined 
understanding of established principles.  Our clinical understanding of intellectual disability is no 
exception.”). 
77. See id. at 28 (“[T]he larger constitutional issue presented by this case is the choice by the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to ignore scientific principles altogether, even those that have been 
clearly accepted and established for decades.”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 72, at 15 (“Texas continues to rely on an outdated diagnostic manual from 1992.  This reliance is 
not justified by scientific or medical practice and risks the misdiagnosis of persons with intellectual 
disability.” (citation omitted)); accord Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) 
(acknowledging that, although medical standards have changed since Atkins and Briseno, the power to 
determine intellectual disability for an Atkins claim rests with the CCA), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). 
78. See Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 486 (“The habeas judge therefore erred by disregarding 
our case law and employing the definition of intellectual disability presently used by the AAIDD . . . .”). 
79. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050.  But see AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 72, at 14–17 (“The clinical definition of adaptive behavior has long focused exclusively on 
adaptive deficits. . . .  The clinician’s diagnostic focus does not—and cannot—involve any form of 
‘balancing’ deficits against the abilities or strengths which the particular individual may also possess.”); 
APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 13 (“[M]ental health professionals 
agree that intellectual disability can and should be diagnosed where there are sufficient deficits in adaptive 
functioning.  That remains true even if the individual has relative strengths in other areas.  The presence 
of relative strengths in some spheres of behavior is not evidence that a person does not have intellectual 
disability.”). 
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diagnosing disability by showing whether the individual’s intellectual 
deficiencies are accompanied by any functioning deficiencies.80  This shift 
creates an unacceptable risk that individuals with a mild disability will not 
be considered intellectually disabled for purposes of an Atkins claim in 
Texas.81  Finally, the Court criticized Texas’s consideration of who a 
majority of its citizens would consider to be intellectually disabled for 
purposes of avoiding capital punishment when developing the Briseno 
factors instead of developing scientifically or clinically-based factors.82  By 
including citizens’ opinions, individuals with a mild intellectual disability 
could face different treatment, and potentially even execution, by Texas than 
they would by other states’ standards.83  As the Court emphasizes, an 
individual with a mild disability is still clinically considered disabled and 
“[s]tates may not execute anyone in the ‘entire category of [intellectually 
disabled] offenders.’”84  Thus, based on the subjective nature of the Briseno 
factors, and because they lack a basis in current clinical or medical standards, 
the Court essentially strikes them down.85 
However, amongst all their criticisms, nowhere did the Court provide 
express guidance on how the states should correctly evaluate an Atkins-
claim.86  Texas is again stuck in the same trial-and-error method observed 
 
80. AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 19. 
81. The CCA appeared to realize the Briseno factors created such a risk for individuals with a 
mild intellectual disability and thus stated their goal was to establish factors that would only exempt 
individuals that the majority of Texas residents would deem exempt.  Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 
6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); accord Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (“After observing that persons with ‘mild’ 
intellectual disability might be treated differently under clinical standards than under Texas’[s] capital 
system, the CCA defined its objective as identifying the ‘consensus of Texas citizens’ on who ‘should 
be exempted from the death penalty.’” (quoting Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6)). 
82. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; see DIX & SCHMOLESKY, supra note 65, at § 49:35 (“The Court 
noted that the constitutional prohibition against capital punishment for those with a sufficient 
intellectual disability is not a matter for democratic vote but a protection based on a constitutional 
protection that cannot be taken away by majoritarian prerogative.”). 
83. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051. 
84. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005)). 
85. See id. at 1044, 1051–52 (“[T]he several factors Briseno set out as indicators of intellectual 
disability are an invention of the CCA untied to any acknowledged source.  Not aligned with the 
medical community’s information, and drawing no strength from our precedent . . . .”); see also DIX & 
SCHMOLESKY, supra note 65, at § 49:35 (“In light of the criticism of Briseno from both sides of the 
Supreme Court in Moore, it seems certain that Briseno cannot remain the guidepost for establishing the 
standards for Atkins immunity from the death penalty much longer in Texas.”). 
86. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“A second problem with the Court’s 
approach is the lack of guidance it offers to States seeking to enforce the holding of Atkins . . . .  Neither 
the Court’s articulation of this standard nor its application sheds any light on what it means.”); see also 
Clinton M. Barker, Note, Substantial Guidance Without Substantive Guides: Resolving the Requirements of 
15
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in the years immediately following the Atkins ruling: a state-developed 
method to evaluate an intellectual disability claim is put into place, the 
Supreme Court holds it unconstitutional but declines to outline a compliant 
method, placing the state back where they started—attempting to develop 
an Atkins-compliant method. 
Without any guidelines from the Supreme Court, the Texas Legislature 
should take it upon themselves to devise a constitutional method for trial 
courts to utilize when presented with an Atkins claim.87  However, despite 
multiple pleas from the CCA, the Texas Legislature has declined to take any 
action in the fifteen years since Atkins.88  The CCA, whose job is to interpret 
the law, is left in a difficult position—the same position they found 
themselves when creating the Briseno factors.89  The CCA is continuously 
presented with a high volume of habeas applications and under the maxim 
of “justice delayed is justice denied,” the Court was forced to act and create 
law where there was none.90  The Briseno factors were, thus, intended to be 
merely temporary guidelines until the legislature acted.91  With the 
abrogation of the Briseno factors and the legislature’s continued reluctance 
to act, the Texas standard has been left in a legal flux.92  In light of the 
 
Moore v. Texas and Hall v. Florida, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (2017) (outlining the lack of guidance 
provided by the Supreme Court in defining “intellectually disabled” in Atkins v. Virginia). 
87. See Petetan v. State, No. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 915530, at *59 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2017) 
(Alcala, J., dissenting) (“The best scenario, of course, would be for the Texas Legislature to formulate 
a standard for deciding intellectual-disability determinations in the context of capital murder cases, as 
long as it acted in accordance with Supreme Court precedent.”). 
88. See Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“The decision to modify 
the legal standard for intellectual disability in the capital-sentencing context rests with this Court unless 
and until the Legislature acts, which we have repeatedly asked it to do.”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017); 
DIX & SCHMOLESKY, supra note 65, at § 49:35 (“The majority’s rejection of Briseno [in Moore] heightens 
the need for the long-unheeded request of the Court of Criminal Appeals for legislative guidance in 
this difficult area.”). 
89. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“This Court does not, under 
normal circumstances, create law.  We interpret and apply the law as written by the Texas Legislature 
or as announced by the United States Supreme Court.”), abrogated by Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039. 
90. Id. 
91. See Petetan, 2017 WL 915530, at *53 (Alcala, J., dissenting) (“In all fairness to the Briseno 
Court, the standard announced in that case was intended to be a temporary solution until the 
Legislature could act to implement a permanent standard, and it made its decision thirteen years ago.”). 
92. See id. at *3–5, 22 (rejecting the court’s ruling upholding the death penalty while the Texas 
standard to determine an “intellectual disability is in flux”); Tommy Witherspoon,  
Court Affirms Conviction, Death Penalty for Petetan, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD (Mar. 8, 2017), 
http://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/court-affirms-conviction-death-penalty-for-petet 
an/article_1c0ded48-1f23-5ab7-9be5-cc4c4e4c3b52.html [perma.cc/WGX6-ADQ2] (“Judge Elsa 
16
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 3, Art. 7
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss3/7
  
2019] COMMENT 1045 
number of habeas applications received constantly by the CCA and the 
number of offenders sentenced to death each year in Texas,93 the state 
needs the legislature to step-up and take on the arduous task of developing 
an Atkins-compliant standard to evaluate claims of intellectual disability.  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Moore has set the stage and provided a perfect 
opportunity for them to do so. 
III.    WHAT NOW?: FACTORS THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE SHOULD 
CONSIDER WHEN FORMULATING AN ATKINS-COMPLIANT METHOD 
FOR EVALUATING CLAIMS OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
A. Abolishing the Death Penalty Is Not the Answer to the Texas Problem 
Until the Supreme Court provides states with express guidelines on how 
to determine when an offender is exempt from capital punishment, the 
states will continue to grapple with this issue.  However, opponents of the 
death penalty believe the answer to be much simpler: abolition.94  While 
abolishment would be an ideal scenario, until capital punishment is 
abolished nationwide, it is unlikely the Texas Legislature would allow such 
legislation to be enacted into law.95  Year after year, Texas politicians 
 
Alcala dissented, saying she preferred not to rule on Petetan’s case while the Texas standard for 
determining whether someone is intellectually disabled is in legal flux.”). 
93. See Andrea Keilen & Maurie Levin, Moving Forward: A Map for Meaningful Habeas Reform in 
Texas Capital Cases, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 224 (2007) (“Of the 411 initial habeas applications filed 
during the combined period encompassed by the Lethal Indifference study and the current study 
(September 1, 1995 through September 1, 2006) . . . .  Article 11.071 fails to consistently fulfill its role 
as the vital safety net protecting the innocent and undeserving from execution.”). 
94. See William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 797, 801–02 (1998) (reasoning abolition of the death penalty should be the goal of all 
industrialized countries); see generally About Us, TEX. COAL. TO ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY, 
http://tcadp.org/about/about-us/ [perma.cc/K9JV-FWT4] (characterizing TCADP as a “statewide 
grassroots advocacy organization dedicated solely to ending the death penalty in Texas”); About Us, 
TEX. MORATORIUM NETWORK, http://www.texasmoratorium.org/about-us [perma.cc/NE7A-
CW77] (describing the non-profit organization’s main goal of “mobilizing statewide support for a 
moratorium on executions in Texas”). 
95. See Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 525 (2017) 
(delineating the nationwide decline of a death sentences and highlighting that the vast majority of 
imposed sentences come from four southern states: Georgia, Florida, Missouri, and Texas); accord Lyn 
Suzanne Entzeroth, The End of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American Death Penalty Regime in 
the Twenty-First Century, 90 OR. L. REV. 797, 834 (2012) (“No state in the Deep South has abolished the 
death penalty, and as demonstrated recently in Texas and Georgia, these states have no qualms about 
carrying out executions.”). 
17
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introduce legislation proposing to abolish the death penalty.96  As predicted, 
the proposed bills fail to make it out of committee.97  In a more realistic 
approach, some members of the Texas Legislature seek to introduce bills 
that would not completely bar the state’s ability to employ capital 
punishment, but would limit its implementation.98  These lawmakers, 
recognizing the difficulty in effectuating any significant change in the Texas 
death penalty, strive to make incremental limitations99 such as: prohibiting 
a death sentence for offenders convicted of capital crimes under the law of 
parties or offenders suffering from a mental illness at the time of the 
 
96. Two Texas State Representatives, Harold Dutton, of District 142, and Jessica Farrar, of 
District 148, seek to introduce abolishment legislation at every session.  Andrew Schneider, Texas House 
Committee Considers Bills to Abolish Death Penalty, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2017/04/18/196638/texas-house-committee-
considers-bills-to-abolish-death-penalty/ [perma.cc/QZ76-6YBW] (“Dutton has proposed a bill to 
eliminate the death penalty in every legislative session since 2003.  Farrar has offered one of her own 
every two years since 2007.”).  See generally Tex. H.B. 64, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (seeking to abolish the 
death penalty, introduced by Representative Harold Dutton, left pending in committee since 2017).  
See Tex. S.B. 597, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (seeking to make the maximum sentence for conviction of a 
capital felony life imprisonment, introduced by Senator Eddie Lucio, left pending in committee since 
2017); Tex. H.B. 1537, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (introducing legislation to end capital punishment, 
introduced by Representative Jessica Farrar, left pending in committee since 2017); see also Press 
Release, Tex. Coal. To Abolish the Death Penalty, Texas House Committee to Hear Death Penalty 
Repeal Bill (Apr. 17, 2017) (on file with author) (announcing the Texas legislature’s holding of a public 
hearing over a proposed bill to abolish the death penalty); Jolie McCullough, Five Death Penalty Reform 
Bills Heard in Texas House Committee, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/04/18/multiple-death-penalty-reform-bills-heard-texas-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/6645-
MVX9] (highlighting death penalty legislation during the 2017 Texas legislative session). 
97. See Tex. H.B. 1032, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (intending to advance legislation maximizing a 
sentence for capital punishment at life or life without parole, introduced by Representative Harold 
Dutton, left pending in committee since 2015); Tex. H.B. 1703, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013) (introducing 
legislation to abolish capital punishment by Representative Jessica Farrar, left pending in committee 
since 2013); Tex. H.B. 819, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011) (introducing legislation to abolish capital punishment 
by Representative Jessica Farrar, left pending in committee since 2011). 
98. See generally Jolie McCullough, Bill to Bar Death Penalty for Mentally Ill Faces Uphill Battle, TEX. 
TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/03/08/texas-bill-would-
eliminate-death-penalty-mentally-ill/ [perma.cc/3FPS-NCKJ] (detailing Representative Toni Rose’s 
efforts to limit the use of capital punishment on the mentally ill); Jolie McCullough, Texas Lawmakers 
Aim to Eliminate Death Penalty for Convicts Who Didn’t Kill, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2017, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/02/01/texas-lawmakers-seek-reform-death-penalty-those-wh/ 
[perma.cc/YF7U-KPZW] [hereinafter McCullough, Texas Lawmakers Aim] (citing efforts by Texas 
Representatives to limit use of capital punishment under the law of parties). 
99. “‘We’ve got to start somewhere when it comes to reforming the death penalty, and there’s 
no better place to start than the law of parties,’ said state Rep. Terry Canales . . . .”  McCullough, Texas 
Lawmakers Aim, supra note 98. 
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crime.100  However, even seeking to enact any limitations is an arduous task 
as Texas is unlikely to impose any restrictions on their use of the death 
penalty until compelled to do so.  In 2001, Texas lawmakers introduced a 
bill seeking to prohibit the imposition of a death sentence upon an 
intellectually disabled offender.101  The bill was passed by the House and 
the Senate, only to be vetoed by Governor Rick Perry.102  The following 
year, in Atkins, the Supreme Court categorically prohibited the execution of 
intellectually disabled offenders nationwide.103  Thus, Texas was forced to 
impose the limitation they sought to avoid by vetoing H.B. 236. 
Establishing this legislative landscape is important to understand that the 
Texas Legislature and judiciary are reluctant to impose any limitations on 
their use of the death penalty unless federally mandated.  Similarly, Texas is 
unlikely to expound on any mandated limitations.  In simpler terms, in 
regard to the death penalty, Texas is likely to only enact the bare minimum 
to comply with federal law.  Therefore, in suggesting guidelines to the 
legislature to replace the Briseno factors in light of Moore, the most effective 
proposition is the bare minimum.  The bare minimum would be 
constitutional but also impose the fewest restrictions upon Texas.  Drafting 
a Moore-compliant statute begins with the Court’s criticisms of the Briseno 
factors: failure to be informed of current medical standards, reliance on 
outdated medical information, and deviation from accepted clinical 
standards.104 
 B. A Proposed Method Should Employ the Use of Current Definitions 
The first step in creating a Moore-compliant method is simple: use current, 
medically-accepted definitions.  The definition utilized by the CCA required 
an offender to prove: 
 
100. See Tex. H.B. 147, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (introducing legislation that would abolish the 
death penalty for coconspirators convicted of capital crimes, introduced by Representative Harold 
Dutton, currently pending in committee); Tex. H.B. 316, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (seeking to have capital 
punishment abolished as to those convicted of capital crimes under the law of parties, introduced by 
Representative Terry Canales, currently pending in committee); Tex. H.B. 3080, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) 
(introducing legislation to prohibit the use of capital punishment on offenders suffering from a serious 
mental illness at the time of the crime). 
101. See Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (proposing to prohibit imposition of a death 
sentence on the intellectually disabled; vetoed by Governor). 
102. Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001). 
103. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“[D]eath is not a suitable punishment for 
a mentally retarded criminal.”). 
104. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1042–43 (2017). 
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(1) he suffers from significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning, 
generally shown by an intelligence quotient (IQ) of [seventy] or less; (2) his 
significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning is accompanied by 
related and significant limitations in adaptive functioning; and (3) the onset of 
the above two characteristics occurred before the age of eighteen.105 
This definition was based on a 1992 definition by the AAIDD.106   
The definition of intellectual disability is dynamic—changing with 
developments in research—and crafted by the two leading organizations in 
diagnosing and treating mental illness, intellectual disability, and 
developmental disorders: American Psychiatric Association and American 
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.107  Both 
organizations utilize a three-prong definition: deficits in intellectual 
functioning and adaptive behavior presented during an individual’s 
developmental period, typically age eighteen.108   
The first prong, limited intellectual functioning, is a measurement of one’s 
mental abilities, such as “reasoning, problem solving, planning, abstract 
thinking, judgment, learning from instruction and experience, and practical 
understanding.”109  One way of measuring limitations in intellectual 
functioning is an IQ score.110  Typically, a score between sixty-five and 
seventy-five will be an indication of disability.111  However, the APA 
advises, since an IQ score is merely an approximation, a professional 
clinician is needed to interpret the score.112  The problem with using an IQ 
score as an indication of intellectual disability arises when an individual’s 
 
105. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 
(2017). 
106. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055. 
107. See AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 1–2 (explaining the 
interests of the AAIDD as “the nation’s oldest and largest organization of professionals in the field of 
intellectual disability”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 1–2  (detailing 
the interest of the APA, “the world’s largest professional association of psychologists”). 
108. See Definition of Intellectual Disability, supra note 65 (“This condition is one of several 
developmental disabilities—that is, there is evidence of the disability during the developmental period, 
which in the US is operationalized as before the age of [eighteen].”).  But see DSM-5, supra note 65, 
at 38 (“Criterion C, onset during the developmental period, refers to recognition that intellectual and 
adaptive deficits are presented during childhood or adolescence.”). 
109. DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37. 
110. Definition of Intellectual Disability, supra note 65. 
111. DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37. 
112. Id. 
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score is above seventy.113  Typically, an individual with an intellectual 
disability will have an IQ score below seventy.114  However, some 
individuals can have a score above seventy but still be diagnosed disabled 
because more severe limitations in their adaptive behaviors could result in a 
lower overall functioning than an individual with an IQ score below 
seventy.115  
This leads to the second prong, limitations in adaptive behavior, which is 
“how well a person meets community standards of personal independence 
and social responsibility, in comparison to others of similar age and 
sociocultural background.”116  This prong encompasses three different 
arenas of adaptive reasoning: “conceptual, social, and practical.”117  
Conceptual reasoning is the academic arena and includes areas such as 
“memory, language, reading, writing, [and] math reasoning.”118  The social 
arena measures an individual’s “awareness of others’ thoughts, feelings, and 
experiences” as wells as their own ability to communicate with others.119  
The third arena encompassed by the second prong, an individual’s practical 
adaptive reasoning, is measured by his ability to maintain a job, financial 
responsibility, and his own self-care.120  The second prong of an intellectual 
disability diagnosis will be satisfied when an individual is deficient in any one 
of these three arenas.121   
For a proper diagnosis under the APA standards, all three prongs must 
be satisfied and “the deficits in adaptive functioning must be directly related 
to the intellectual impairments” under the first prong.122  Therefore, the 
 
113. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 
27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 13 (2003). 
114. Id. 
115. See DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37 (“[A] person with an IQ score above [seventy] may have 
such severe adaptive behavior problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that 







121. See id. at 38 (“Criterion B is met when at least one domain of adaptive functioning . . . is 
sufficiently impaired that ongoing support is needed in order for the person to perform adequately in 
one or more life settings at school, at work, at home, or in the community.”). 
122. Id.  The CCA refers to this as the “relatedness requirement.”  See Ex parte Moore, 
470 S.W.3d 481, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“In making a relatedness determination, the factfinder 
may consider the seven evidentiary factors that we developed in Briseno . . . .”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 
(2017). 
21
Green: Texas, the Death Penalty, and Intellectual Disability
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
1050 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1029 
CCA reasoned the Briseno factors, although based on an outdated diagnostic 
manual, were still “adequately ‘informed by the medical community’s 
diagnostic framework.’”123  However, under the current standards 
employed by the AAIDD, this relatedness is no longer required.124  In their 
criticism of the CCA, the Court never explicitly instructs states to employ 
the AAIDD standard in place of the APA standard and omit the 
requirement of relatedness between the first and second prong.  However, 
the Court goes on to emphasize the absence of the relatedness requirement 
from Texas statutes establishing standards for determining intellectual 
disability in areas other than capital punishment.125  Therefore, in drafting 
a Moore-compliant statute, the Texas Legislature should utilize this current 
three-prong definition of intellectual disability without the relatedness 
requirement. 
C. A Proposed Method Should Rely on Current Diagnostic Standards Established 
by Medical and Psychological Experts 
In Atkins, the Supreme Court gave the states the authority to establish 
their own method to enforce their rulings.126  Twelve years later, in Hall, 
the Court narrowed the authority given to the states by holding that such 
authority did not allow the states to disregard current medical standards.127  
The Court’s criticism of the Briseno factors focused on multiple ways in 
which the factors failed to follow current standards in diagnosing intellectual 
disability.128  Therefore, in order to be Moore-compliant, a proposed method 
should, at a minimum, utilize current diagnostic standards.  
  
 
123. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 487 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 722–23 (2014)). 
124. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“By the time Moore’s case reached 
the CCA, the AAIDD no longer included the requirement that adaptive deficits be ‘related’ to 
intellectual functioning.”). 
125. See id. at 1052 (“[T]he relatedness requirement Texas defends here is conspicuously absent 
from the standards the State uses to assess students for intellectual disabilities.” (citation omitted)); 
accord 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1040(c)(5) (providing guidelines for determining intellectual 
disability of a student); 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 380.8751(e)(3) (outlining the standard for diagnosing 
intellectual disability for juvenile offenders). 
126. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002). 
127. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712, 723 (2014).  
128. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053 (“By rejecting the habeas court’s application of medical 
guidance and clinging to the standard it laid out in Briseno, including the wholly nonclinical Briseno 
factors, the CCA failed adequately to inform itself of the ‘medical community’s diagnostic 
framework[.]’” (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 721 (2014))). 
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1. Current Diagnostic Standards Require Equal Assessment 
of All Three Prongs to Determine Intellectual Disability 
As explained above, in Section B, individuals with an IQ score above 
seventy can still be diagnosed intellectually disabled due to more severe 
limitations in their adaptive functioning.129  This is the point where states 
attempting to comply with Atkins have gone awry.  A few states, including 
Florida, refused to allow any evidence of limitations in adaptive behavior, 
the second prong of the intellectual disability determination, if an individual 
had an IQ score above seventy.130  The Supreme Court invalidated this 
bright-line cut off because it considered an IQ score as conclusive evidence 
of intellectual disability contrary to professional standards.131  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court criticized Texas for failing to comply with Hall, and 
proceeded to the second prong of diagnosis when Moore’s score was “close 
to, but above, [seventy][.]”132  Factoring in the five points of standard 
measurement error into Moore’s score of seventy-four produces a score 
below seventy.133  Thus, because Moore’s IQ range was below seventy, the 
CCA was required to proceed to the second prong and evaluate his adaptive 
behavior.134 
In order to comply with the current medical and professional standards, 
the proposed Texas method should embody a more holistic approach by 
 
129. See DSM-5, supra note 65, at 33 (“The various levels of severity are defined on the basis of 
adaptive functioning, and not IQ scores, because it is adaptive functioning that determines the level of 
supports required.”). 
130. E.g., Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712, 714 (Fla. 2007) (construing section 921.137 of 
the Florida Statute as establishing a bright-line cut off for intellectual disability at an IQ of seventy and 
refusing to allow the defendant to present evidence of the second prong of the intellectual disability 
determination because of an IQ score of seventy-two), abrogated by, Hall, 572 U.S. 701. 
131. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 712 (“Florida’s rule disregards established medical practice . . . .  It 
takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts 
in the field would consider other evidence.”).  
132. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (“The CCA’s conclusion that Moore’s IQ scores established 
that he is not intellectually disabled is irreconcilable with Hall.  Hall instructs that, where an IQ score 
is close to, but above, [seventy], courts must account for the test’s ‘standard error of measurement.’” 
(quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 724)). 
133. Id.; see also Leigh D. Hagan & Thomas J. Guilmette, The Death Penalty and Intellectual 
Disability: Not So Simple, 23 CRIM. JUST. 21, 23 (2017) (explaining the standard error of measurement 
generally accepted by psychologists is five IQ points). 
134. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050 (“[I]n line with Hall, we require that courts continue the 
inquiry and consider other evidence of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted 
for the test’s standard error, falls within the clinically established range for intellectual-functioning 
deficits.”). 
23
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evaluating all evidence of intellectual disability equally.135  Current 
standards used by mental health professionals still use an IQ score, not as 
conclusive proof of a disability or lack thereof, but as one of multiple factors 
to consider when making a diagnosis.136  Therefore, a proposed method 
should instruct trial courts to allow defendants making an Atkins claim to 
present evidence of their IQ score and evidence of their adaptive behaviors 
to be considered as a whole.137  Including such an instruction would ensure 
the proposed method was informed by current mental health standards and 
in compliance with Hall and Moore.138   
2. Current Diagnostic Standards for Adaptive Deficits  
At his habeas hearing, Moore presented strong evidence of limitations in 
his adaptive behaviors, such as inability to conform to social norms and low 
levels of reading, writing, and mathematical skills.139  The habeas court 
focused solely on the deficiencies in Moore’s adaptive behaviors and thus 
found him to be intellectually disabled and exempt from execution.140  In 
their denial of relief, the CCA faulted the habeas court for failing to also 
consider Moore’s adaptive strengths.141  The CCA then proceeded to 
catalog the “adaptive strengths” Moore had developed “by living on the 
street, playing pool and mowing lawns for money” and through the 
 
135.  See APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 8 (“A comprehensive 
assessment must be ‘based on multiple data points’ that ‘include giving equal consideration to 
significant limitations in adaptive behavior and intellectual functioning.’” (quoting ROBERT L. 
SCHALOCK ET AL., INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF 
SUPPORTS 28 (11th ed. 2010))). 
136. Id. 
137. See id. (“The criteria to diagnose intellectual disability are not evaluated separately, in 
disjunctive inquiries, but are rather considered together during a clinical evaluation by a mental health 
professional.” (citing DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37)); see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 535 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2015) (Alcala, J., dissenting) (declining to join the majority because their determination of 
Moore not being intellectually disabled based solely on in IQ score was contrary to the holding in Hall), 
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). 
138. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (ruling the Texas method in violation of Hall for their view of 
IQ score and for their failure to be aligned with current medical standards); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 
701, 721 (2014) (holding a determination of intellectual disability must be “informed by the views of 
medical experts” and courts may not consider an IQ score as conclusive evidence of intellectual 
disability); see also DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37 (“The diagnosis of intellectual disability is based on both 
clinical assessment and standardized testing of intellectual and adaptive function.”). 
139. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 520, 522. 
140. Id. at 484, 489. 
141. See id. at 489 (“The habeas court therefore additionally erred to the extent that it . . . 
considered only weaknesses in applicant’s functional abilities.”). 
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knowledgeable way in which he committed the instant offense.142  The 
CCA used Moore’s adaptive strengths to counteract his deficits and, as a 
result, held he failed to prove “he [had] significant . . . limitations in adaptive 
functioning.”143  The Supreme Court opined the CCA erred in considering 
any adaptive strengths Moore had, especially those developed in prison.144  
These considerations are contrary to current diagnostic standards.145   
In diagnosing intellectual disability, mental health experts focus only on 
an individual’s limitations in their adaptive behaviors— “things that an 
individual cannot do in everyday life.”146  Similarly, current diagnostic 
standards disregard any adaptive behaviors acquired while incarcerated.147  
Those adaptive behaviors, because developed in such a controlled 
environment, are not accurate assessments of the individual’s limitations in 
everyday life.148   
The CCA further deviated from current “clinical practice by requiring 
Moore to show that his adaptive deficits were not related to ‘a personality 
disorder.’”149  The CCA employed the Briseno factors to make the 
“relatedness determination”—that the individual’s limitations in adaptive 
behaviors was related to the first prong, their limited intellectual 
functioning.150  Under this method, an individual failing to prove his 
deficits in adaptive functioning were not related to another cause, like a 
personality disorder, would not be considered intellectually disabled and 
thus exempt from execution.151  Mental health experts condemn this 
 
142. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047 (citing Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 522–23). 
143. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 520, 524–25. 
144. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050. 
145. See id. (“Moore’s adaptive strengths, in the CCA’s view, constituted evidence adequate to 
overcome the considerable objective evidence of Moore’s adaptive deficits[.]  But the medical 
community focuses on the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.” (citations omitted)). 
146. AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 15; accord APA Amici 
Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 13 (“[M]ental health professionals agree that 
intellectual disability can and should be diagnosed where there are sufficient deficits in adaptive 
functioning.  That remains true even if the individual has relative strengths in other areas.”). 
147. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050 (“Clinicians, however, caution against reliance on adaptive 
strengths developed ‘in a controlled setting,’ as prison surely is.” (quoting DSM-5, supra note 65, at 38). 
148. See AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 16 n.17 (“Clinicians 
agree that prison behavior is not a valid measure of an individual’s real-life functioning.”). 
149. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (2017) (quoting Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 488 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2015) , vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017)). 
150. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 489. 
151. See id. at 488 (“[I]t is not sufficient for an applicant to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he has significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning and significant limitations 
in adaptive functioning.  An applicant must also demonstrate . . . that his adaptive behavior deficits are 
25
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relatedness requirement based on a longstanding understanding that 
individuals diagnosed with intellectual disability are likely to also be afflicted 
with other physical or mental conditions.152  Therefore, the presence of any 
other cause or disorder should not preclude a finding of intellectual 
disability.153 
Based on the above criticisms and accepted standards, a proposed Texas 
method should include the following instructions for trial courts assessing 
the second prong of intellectual disability: (1) the fact-finder should only 
consider an individual’s limitations in adaptive functioning, no consideration 
of adaptive skills should be made; (2) the fact-finder should consider only 
adaptive deficits developed outside of a controlled environment; and (3) the 
fact-finder should not require the individual to prove his adaptive deficits 
are not related to any other co-occurring disorder.154  Including these 




related to significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning rather than some other cause.” 
(citations omitted) (citing Ex parte Hearn, 310 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010))); see also Ex 
parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151, 163–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (denying applicant’s claim of intellectual 
disability because he failed to prove his limitations in adaptive functioning were related to impaired 
intellectual ability and not to other causes, like poverty). 
152. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (“As mental-health professionals recognize, however, many 
intellectually disabled people also have other mental or physical impairments . . . .” (citing DSM-5, supra 
note 65, at 40)); see also AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 20 (“Many 
individuals who have intellectual disability also have other mental or physical disabilities.  Co-existing 
conditions . . . can arise in the evaluation process in some Atkins cases.  This phenomenon has long 
been recognized by clinicians and mental health professionals.”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting 
Petitioner, supra note 72, at 19 (“[P]ersons with intellectual disability are three to four times more likely 
to have co-occurring mental disorders—with personality disorders being one type of many such 
disorders—than the general population.” (citing DSM-5, supra note 65, at 40)).  
153. See AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 22 (“The fact that 
an individual who has intellectual disability also has another mental condition or mental illness does 
not alter the diagnostic process.”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 19 
(“The existence of a personality disorder or other mental health issue is emphatically not evidence that 
a person does not also have an intellectual disability.” (citing Jannelien Weiland et al., The Prevalence of 
Personality Disorders in Psychiatric Outpatients with Borderline Intellectual Functioning: Comparison with Outpatients 
from Regular Mental Health Care and Outpatients with Mild Intellectual Disabilities, 69 NORDIC J. PSYCHIATRY 
599, 602 (2015); NATIONAL ASS’N FOR THE DUALLY DIAGNOSED, DIAGNOSTIC MANUAL—
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A TEXTBOOK OF DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS IN PERSONS 
WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 248–49 (Robert J. Fletcher et al. eds., 2007); Lambert v. State, 
126 P.3d 646, 655 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005))). 
154. This third instruction would be unnecessary if the proposed method included the currently 
accepted definition of intellectual disability as suggested in Part III, Section B, which does away with 
the relatedness requirement. 
26
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employed by the AAIDD and the APA.155 
D. A Proposed Method Should Include Only Definitions and Standards Utilized by 
Professionals and Exclude Any Stereotypes Associated with Intellectual Disability 
In order for intellectually disabled offenders to be exempt from execution 
in Texas, the Briseno court required those offenders to meet the standards 
that the majority of its citizens would consider to be disabled.156  
Consideration of these nonprofessional opinions resulted in the Briseno 
factors including stereotypes of the intellectually disabled.157  Texas’s 
inclusion of stereotypes has received criticism from both the Supreme Court 
and mental health experts.158  Inclusion of subjective, non-medical factors 
could lead to the execution of an individual with an intellectual disability.159  
Therefore, a proposed method should avoid including any considerations 
or opinions of stereotypes or non-professionals when making a 
determination of intellectual disability.160  The suggestions to a proposed 
method included above strictly follow current diagnostic standards.  Thus, 




155. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052–53 (abrogating Texas’s Briseno factors for multiple reasons, 
including their failure to follow diagnostic standards utilized by mental health professionals); AAIDD 
Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 19–20, 28 (presenting to the Supreme Court 
the current, clinically accepted standards in diagnosing intellectual disability and addressing the ways in 
which the Texas method deviates from those standards); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting 
Petitioner, supra note 72, at 16–17  (detailing to the Supreme Court the ways in which the Briseno factors 
fail to be informed by experts or have any basis in science or medicine). 
156. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by Moore, 137 S. Ct. 
1039. 
157. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; see Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8 (providing all seven, nonclinical 
factors, the first being: “Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his 
family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if 
so, act in accordance with that determination?”). 
158. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051–52 (explaining the risk of execution presented to mildly 
intellectually disabled offenders by the subjectivity of the Briseno factors); APA Amici Curiae Brief 
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 16–17 (“[T]he factors Texas allows factfinders to use to 
determine eligibility for relief under Atkins distort the assessment of adaptive functioning by . . . relying 
on stereotypes of intellectual disability . . . .”). 
159. APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 17, 26. 
160. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 539–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Alcala, J., dissenting), 
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 26. 
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E. When Formulating a Proposed Method, Mental Health Professionals 
Should Be Consulted 
The suggestions provided above are the bare minimum which would 
ensure a new method is in compliance with Atkins, Hall, and Moore.161  As 
explained, the most vital aspect of crafting a new method to determine 
intellectual disability is ensuring it is aligned with current diagnostic 
standards utilized by mental health professionals.162  The Briseno factors 
were judge-made law, formulated by the judges at the CCA, who are experts 
in law but not necessarily experts in diagnosing intellectual disability.163  
Lawmakers have greater access to those experts through advisory 
committees and advocacy groups comprised of professionals in the field 
providing the most up-to-date information.164  Therefore, the Texas 
Legislature is better positioned to create new law to replace the Briseno 
factors.  In order to ensure a new method is in compliance with the most 
current standards, the Texas Legislature should utilize these resources when 
formulating a new method for courts to follow when determining 
exemption from capital punishment. 
 
161. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (abrogating the Briseno factors and outlining the ways in which 
they are unconstitutional); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 722–23 (2014) (rejecting a bright-line IQ cutoff 
method and requiring the states’ methods to be informed by currently accepted medical standards); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317, 321 (2002) (prohibiting the execution of all intellectually disabled 
persons but leaving to the states to determine which offenders qualify). 
162. See Petetan v. State, No. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 915530, at *50 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 
2017) (Alcala, J., dissenting) (detailing why a new Texas method should be based on current diagnostic 
standards in order to comply with Hall v. Florida); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 531–34 (explaining 
why, based on precedence, “[t]he Supreme Court [r]equires a [c]ourt to [c]onsider [c]urrent [m]edical 
[s]tandards in [e]valuating [w]hether the [e]vidence [e]stablishes the [t]here-[p]ronged [g]eneral 
[s]tandard for [i]ntellectual [d]isability”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, 
at 26 (imploring the Supreme Court to strike down the Briseno factors for failing to align with current 
diagnostic standards). 
163. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1054 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[C]linicians, not judges, should 
determine clinical standards; and judges, not clinicians, should determine the content of the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
164. See Intellectual and Developmental Disability System Redesign Advisory Committee,  
TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://hhs.texas.gov/about-hhs/leadership/advisory-comm 
ittees/intellectual-developmental-disability-system-redesign-advisory-committee [perma.cc/2UDA-
HBSN] (providing information on a committee which advises governmental agencies on the support 
needed by the intellectually disabled to effectively implement a new senate bill); Mission, History, and 
Achievements, ARC TEX., https://www.thearcoftexas.org/who-we-are/ [perma.cc/E7WQ-NLU9] 
(detailing the goals and achievements the advocacy group has had for the intellectually disabled through 
the Texas Legislature). 
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IV.    CONCLUSION 
Since its statehood, the death penalty has had deep roots in Texas, causing 
it to be the deadliest state in the Union.165  The strong support capital 
punishment finds in Texas makes abolishment unlikely, unless federally 
mandated.  However, in recent years, Texas has been forced to narrow their 
scope of capital punishment as a result of limitations imposed by the 
Supreme Court, including exclusion of the intellectually disabled.  Through 
their prohibition, the Supreme Court left to the states the authority to 
develop their own methods for determining intellectually disability without 
providing any guidance to ensure the developed methods were 
constitutional.  As a result, the states developed a myriad of methods, some 
of which were later declared unconstitutional, including Texas’s.  The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Moore v. Texas was a call to the Texas Legislature 
to formulate a new, constitutional method.  In their formulation of a new 
method to determine intellectual disability, the Texas Legislature should 
consider the following suggestions: utilize current definitions, rely on 
current diagnostic standards, including equally considering evidence of all 
three prongs, focus only on adaptive deficits developed outside of a 
controlled environment, and not requiring the deficits be independent of 
any other disorders.  By following these suggestions, the Texas Legislature 
can ensure their method will comply with Moore, Hall, and Atkins. 
  
 
165. Facts About the Death Penalty, supra note 5. 
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